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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to clarify, whether and where the widespread opinion that 
systemic change from socialism to capitalism went along with dramatically rising 
inequality is true and how income distribution does affect the overall growth 
performance of transition countries. The countries under review are: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. The findings are analysed against the 
background of convergence or divergence respectively vis-à-vis the European Union 
(EU) level of income and income distribution. Here Germany, being the neighbouring 
country and biggest EU economy, is taken as benchmark. 
For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland it can be shown that income distribution 
remained relatively stable before and throughout the transition period on the basis of so 
far unpublished data from the Luxemburg Income Study database. Russia however 
displays a sharp increase in income distribution. These results are illustrated by Lorenz 
curves and underpinned by developments in functional income distribution and social 
transfers. An attempt is made to locate these transition countries on a stylised Kuznets 
curve and further qualitative factors referring to growth and equality are considered. 
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Income Distribution and Convergence in the Transition Process 
- 
A Cross Country Comparison 
Jens Hölscher* 
1. Introduction 
Income distribution has dramatically changed during transition from planned to market 
economies, the saga goes. The aim of this study is to clarify, whether and where this 
statement is true and how income distribution does affect the overall growth 
performance of transition countries. There is a vast amount of literature on real and 
nominal convergence of the new European Union (EU) member countries to “old” EU 
member countries’ standards1, but little is known about the behaviour of income 
distribution. Is the dramatic increase in income inequality overshooting EU levels or 
will there be a convergence in the sense of assimilation to EU levels? The countries 
under review are: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland as the most important new EU 
member economies and Russia in order to have a comparison with a non-EU accession 
country. The findings are analysed against the background of convergence or divergence 
respectively vis-à-vis the EU level of income and income distribution. Here Germany, 
being the neighbouring country and biggest EU economy, is taken as benchmark2. 
In the field of income inequality research Tthe current state of the art in income 
inequality research can be summarised as the “Transatlantic Consensus”, which explains 
inequality through a partial analysis approach with changes on the labour market at its 
core. This approach and its explanatory value for transition economies will be critically 
discussed from a macroeconomic point of view. The potential interrelationship between 
inequality and growth is particularly important for transition countries, because, 
according to conventional wisdom, these countries have experienced  in this case 
systemic change went along with rising inequality and declining GDP. in the initial 
phase. 
For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland it can be shown that income distribution 
remained relatively stable before and throughout the transition period on the basis of so 
far unpublished data from the Luxemburg Income Study database. Russia, however, 
                                                 
* University of Brighton, UK, j.holscher@brighton.ac.uk. This study was elaborated during the author’s 
research stay at the Institute for Economic Research Halle (IWH). Meticulous research assistance of Karin 
Szalai is gratefully acknowledged. I do also thank Hubert Gabrisch and other participants of the IWH 
research seminar for valuable discussion and comments as well as constructive criticism by two 
anonymous referees of this journal. The article benefited greatly from Jeff Miller’s meticulous editing. 
1 See Yigit/Kutan 2004 for an analytical review on the impact of European integration on convergence 
using advanced comparison techniques.  
2 Further reasons for the choice of this particular set of countries are give later in more detail. 
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displays a sharp increase in inequality.come distribution. These results are illustrated by 
Lorenz curves and underpinned by developments in functional income distribution. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section summarises the standard 
explanation of rising inequality, which is a microeconomic approach in a partial 
analytical framework. Its application to transition economies is briefly presented. The 
third section reflects upon macroeconomic issues related to the distribution of income. 
Various approaches are discussed in this context. The fourth section presents an 
empirical analysis of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia. It is organised in 
the sequence of general income development, personal income distribution and 
functional income distribution plus transfers. The fifth section reconsiders the 
performance of each country and gives hypothetical explanations. The conclusion puts 
the countries under review into the context of convergence and divergence. 
2. The “standard explanation” of rising inequality and its 
application to transition economies 
The “standard explanation” of rising income inequality relates income inequality to the 
labour market. According to this explanation, which Atkinson (2000) calls 
‘Transatlantic Consensus’, rising wage inequality is the key of conceptualising rising 
income inequality in general. After a long period of lack of interest in the issue of 
income distribution, epitomised by Henry Aaron, who noted in 1978 (see 
Gottshalk/Smeeding for the following) that tracking changes in the distribution of 
income in the United States “was like watching the grass grow” a new interest emerged. 
Since the early eighties rising wage dispersion in the US labour market could be 
observed. Empirical studies could show that these changes in earnings lead to rising 
inequality of household incomes. A similar observation could be made in the United 
Kingdom and continental Europe, although on the European mainland rising inequality 
went along with increasing unemployment. 
The mechanics of the ‘Transatlantic Consensus’ are as follows: A shift in relative 
demand from unskilled to skilled workers leads to higher wages dispersion, because the 
wage premium increases in favour of those who are employed in the skilled labour 
sector. As wages for workers in the unskilled labour sectors correspondingly fall 
relatively, the overall inequality in earnings has widened. The channel of this 
explanation to the European continent (in particular France) is that effective minimum 
wage protection leads to higher unemployment rather then decreasing wages for the 
unskilled workers. Although there is widespread agreement upon the mechanics of 
rising inequality, the reasons for the shift away from unskilled to skilled workers are 
disputed. Globalisation and technology changes are most prominently featured and refer 
to the increase in international trade and the advent of electronic commerce. Whatever 
the reasons for the shift per se are, for the purpose of this analysis it seems noteworthy 
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that the mechanics of this partial analytical “standard explanation” are robust enough to 
create the ‘Transatlantic Consensus’ within the academic community. 
This analysis ese mechanics arehas been extended to the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe and further East by Milanovic (2000). He has written , who produced the most 
authoritative empirical overview in that field so far, Milanovic (1998). He defines the 
tTransition from planned to market economies is defined as “the removal of legal 
restrictions on the private sector”3. For the pre transition scenario it is assumed that the 
majority of workers were employed in the state sector and that income there was 
distributed more equally - albeit on a lower level - than in the private sector4. Within 
this set-up the same mechanics as in the ‘Transatlantic Consensus’ operate: Parallel to 
the demand-shift-story of Western industrialised countries, in the transition countries a 
shift from the state sector employment to the private sector employment of the labour 
market explains rising inequality in earnings and finally rising general inequality. Again, 
the robustness of the partial analytical approach is striking. We will return to the 
explanatory power of the approach for economics of transition after the consideration of 
macroeconomic aspects of income distribution in the following section. 
3. Macroeconomic aspects of income distribution 
First of all fFrom a macroeconomic point of view the labour market explanation for 
inequality can only be part of the story, because there are more sources of income than 
wages. In the tradition of David Ricardo a distinction would have to be made between 
transfers (rent in Ricardo’s terminology), profits and wages. The focus of interest in 
macroeconomics is the functional distribution of income rather than the personal 
distribution. Traditionally functional income distribution is conjunct with “laws” of 
economic development. For example Ricardo created his hypothesis of stagnation of 
capitalist development on the basis of his assumption that finally production would be 
for the benefit of the rent recipient (the landlord) only. His pupil Marx however 
concluded the breakdown of capitalism; because profit shares of income would increase 
that much that the exploited working class would overthrow the whole capitalist system. 
In modern approaches rising inequality would be limited by a poverty line, below which 
macroeconomic stability would be jeopardised by political unrest.  
In the 20
th
 century research into income equality is affiliated with the work of Simon 
Kuznets’, whose seminal work on the relationship of economic growth and income 
inequality asked the following were path breaking. His research-leading question “Does 
inequality in the distribution of income increase or decrease in the course of a country’s 
                                                 
3 The shortcomings of such an unusual definition of ‘transition’ will become evident later in the course 
of this study. At this stage it is accepted for the sake of the Milanovic’s argument. 
4 We have some reservations concerning the empirical validity of this assumption, as there are pockets of 
very low wages in services industries of the private sector. For the sake of the model this aspect is not 
pursued here further. 
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economic growth?” (1955, p. 1). will be taken up again later in this study. He himself 
focused on long run developments including sectoral changes from agricultural to 
industrial production and the emergence of services. His observations lead to that 
initially inequality rises with growing GDP per head in a country and after a maximum 
in inequality is reached decreases again, was sketched in the so-called Kuznets-curve. by 
his successors. The Kuznets curve has an inverted U-shape and its message is 
interpreted in the way that rising inequality is growth supporting initially, but after 
reaching a a certain maximum of inequality referring to a certain income per head is 
reached, rising equality would be growth supporting. 
Compared to Kuznets, who always stressed, that “… distribution should be complete, 
i.e. should cover all units in a country …” (1955, p. 1) the probably most obvious 
weakness of the labour market explanation of income inequality within the 
‘Transatlantic Consensus’ is that it neglects unemployment to the extent that as far as it 
can not be explained by minimum wages. If faced with a scenario of It has little to say 
about non-voluntary unemployment. , this approach has very little to say, as the “unit” 
of the unemployed is left out.This is an important not as trivial as it seems, because it 
points to the methodological limitation. of the partial analytical approach. Either the 
focus is the labour market or it is not. There is little room for heterogeneity of labour 
beyond skilled and unskilled. A macroeconomic approach would look at the aggregate 
demand for labour and its effect on labour markets and income creation. At the end of 
the chain one would expect some effect on income equality, which might indeed to a 
certain extentd be related to changes in earnings, i. e. the labour market, but would take 
further sources into account. 
Also, the macroeconomic approach would have to emphasise that a demand-shift story 
within the labour market like the ‘Transatlantic Consensus’ suffers from any reaction of 
the stock of human capital. At least in the longer run economic intuition would have to 
assume that workers would make endeavours to move from the sector of unskilled 
labour into the sector of skilled labour by investment into education. This is a general 
macroeconomic aspect to the partial analysis, which is particularly relevant for transition 
countries. As far as labour skills are concerned it can be assumed and is described in a 
number of studies (see for example EBRD 1999, Keane/Prasad 2000) In the that through 
the rapidly changing environment for work during transition old labour human capital 
skills were devalued (much like  and the stock of human capital underwent a similar 
experience as the stock of the physical capital stock) (See for example EBRD 1999, 
Keane/Prasad 2000).  
At the end of the 20
th
 century the general question of interrelationship between the level 
of income per head/household and the distribution of income is taken up again, this time 
by neoclassical growth theory. Barro (2000) statesprovides evidence that higher 
inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries and encourage growth in wealthier 
countries. richer places. His broad panel of countries does, however, show little overall 
relation between income inequality and rates of growth and investment. Transition 
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economies are not included, as within the framework of a growth model the period is 
presumably too short.  The threshold between poor countries, where growth tends to fall 
with greater inequality and rich countries, where growth rises with increasing inequality 
is found “around $2000 (1985 U. S. dollars)” per capita GDP (Barro 2000, p. 32). From 
an analytical point of view it seems to be of interest that tThis new approach to income 
distribution confirms the old view on income distribution, because “The Kuznets curve 
– whereby inequality first increases and later decreases in the process of economic 
development – emerges as a clear empirical regularity.” (Barro 2000, p. 32).  
Growth in transition appears to be a more complex phenomenon.; first of all bBecause 
the time span is relatively short, what makes it is almost impossible to make a 
distinction between short term and medium term effects. Here following 
Campos/Coricelli (2002) the term “growth” is used in a more literal sense refersring to 
the short or medium term. respectively. This is an important implication, which might 
make it very difficult to say anything about “growth” and “income distribution” in 
transition countries at all. The following section looks at what can be observed and 
whether or not Barrow’s statement above applies for transition economies, too. 
4. The observations 
This section presents empirical findings on general, personal and functional (plus 
transfers) income dynamics and income distribution. Data on income distribution are 
obtained from LIS (Luxemburg Income Study Database), which is considered to be 
being the most thoroughly validated dataset of based on household survey 
datamicrocensi. Data on functional income distribution plus transfers were obtained 
from the national statistical offices. The empirical approach differs in so far from the 
Milanovic study quoted earlier, as it is income based rather than earnings based. As laid 
out on theoretical grounds, t This approach does provide a reflect a more complete 
picture taking into account aspects of macroeconomics of income distribution changes. . 
Therefore it is no surprise that different results will be elaborated. 
 
As a set of countries tThe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Russia were chosen 
because . The firstthese three countries are the economic “heavy weights” in terms of 
GDP among of thosethe transition countries, which recently joined the European Union. 
Russia is chosen as the “heavy weight” of economic transition that does not have EU 
candidate status. A further pragmatic reason lies in the fact that relative reliable data 
(although not always complete, see for example Russia) in income distribution were 
available, which is not the case for South East European countries and most of the 
former Soviet Union countries. In addition there is a peculiar interest on how income 
distribution might develop in comparison to the big debate of income (as GDP per head) 
convergence or divergence. 
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4.1. General income development 
As an introduction to income dynamics this sub-section looks at income creation within 
the sample of countries measured in real GDP growth. Here we find a picture of 
convergence and divergence to EU levels. 
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Figure 15. Development of real GDP during Systemic Transition, 1989-2000 
Figure 1 shows the development of real GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Russia measured with 1989 as basis year. We find the so-called J-curve of 
transformation (see also Hölscher 1999a) in the case of Hungary and Poland, but a 
picture of recession and stagnation in the Czech Republic and long lasting recession in 
Russia, which only recently turned into considerable growth rates. For Hungary and 
Poland the J-curves show an upswing after the first years of “transformation recession” 
and an economic recovery displaying higher levels of GDP in the longer run than before 
transition began. The Czech picture is characterised by stagnation after a short recovery 
from the early recession and even further recession after 1997, the year of the Czech 
banking and balance of payments crisis. The same year marks the lowest level of GDP 
in Russia, which coincided with the Rouble crisis. Interpretation of this graph has to be 
careful, because the choice of the basis year is crucial and serious reservations about the 
comparability of data across the transition period are appropriate. However, this method 
has been used customised by various institutions (including Worldbank, EBRD etc.) and 
due to comparability with other studies the approach is maintained here. In this study the 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that this style of indexed presentation is chosen for the purpose to compare the 
performance of the countries under review in this study. I t does not say anything about the absolute 
level of income. Real GDP per head in the benchmark country Germany is 2-3 times higher. 
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research leading question is how far thise  general economic performance can be related 
to the distribution of income. 
4.2. Personal income distribution and Ffunctional income 
distribution(plus transferss) 
The analysis of personal income distribution is base on household surveys carried out 
through microcensi household surveys by the authorities in the relevant countries 
validated by LIS6. Household income potentially includes every income source from the 
functional income distribution; i. e. a household might receive wages, profits as well as 
transfers. Although the microcensus varies from country to country, they are it is trusted 
the validatedation by LIS to ensure does secure comparability.  
This analysis uses the Gini coefficient as empirical measure of income inequality. The 
Gini coefficient is derived from the cumulative distribution of earnings across the 
population as per capita incomes. It is defined as one half of the mean difference 
between any two observations in the earnings distribution divided by average earnings. 
The higher the Gini coefficient, the higher is inequity within a society. One familiar 
interpretation of the Gini coefficient is the Lorenz curve, which graphs cumulated 
income shares versus cumulativeed population shares. Population is ordered from low to 
high incomes. In this context, the Gini coefficient can be computed as twice the area 
between the 45-degree line that extends northeastwardly from the origin and the Lorenz 
curve. The 45-degree line represents equal income distribution across the population and 
the larger the distance of the Lorenz curve to the equal distribution line the greater is 
income inequality.  
The Lorenz curve for Germany in 1998 is taken as benchmark. The reason for choosing 
Germany 1998 is first of all that it follows conventional research practice in using 
former West-Germany as benchmark for Ex-East-Germany in almost any economic 
respect, including income distribution. More important for this choice is that however 
that the former West-Germany is regarded as a proxy for West European income 
distribution reflecting a social market economy expressed inter alia in an income 
distribution being much more equal than for example the UK but less equal  so than for 
example the Scandinavian countries7. The year 1989 is for Germany not problematic as 
in West-Germany income equality was very stable over the years. 
Tables 1-3 in the appendix give more detailed information of what is illustrated and 
briefly discussed her by Lorenz curves. Table one shows the ccumulativeed  personal 
income distribution of selected countries and years and in comparison to Germany 1998 
                                                 
6 A previous version of this study has been published in 2002 as Luxembourg Income Study Working 
Paper No. 275. 
7In the transition literature the distance from Düsseldorf is used in a similar fashion as a proxy for distance 
from Western European Markets (see Campos/Coricelli 2002). 
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(per household) in per cent cumulated quintile shares and the change vis-à-vis Germany 
as benchmark. Table two displays changes of personal income distribution of selected 
countries between selected years (per household) in per cent change rates in quintile 
shares. Table three shows the ddistribution of household income according to decile 
shares (per household), in per cent. 
Functional income distribution is presented observed here for two reasons: (1) Firstly to 
capture macroeconomic aspects of income distribution as outlined in Ssection 3three of 
this study and (2) secondly to give a picture of the sources of incomes for the following 
subsection on personal income. The aim is also to provide evidence for an analysis of 
referring to the overall the economic performances of the countries under review 
allowing some considerations referring and  to the interrelationship between profits and 
investment. In addition an attempt will be made to relate changes in personal income 
distribution to changes in functional income distribution, transfers and other factors. As 
there are methodological problems in reservations for cross-country comparisons of 
profit ratios etc. due to different national definitions and tax systems emphasis here is 
placed laid on change rather than absolute size, and no benchmark country is chosen. 
4.2.1 The Czech Republic 
The Lorenz curve for the Czech Republic shows an increase in inequality from 1988 to 
1992, which developed on the expense of the lower decile share, whereas the higher 
deciles remained more or less unchanged. This is also the year of intersection with the 
German Lorenz curve with the intersection point within the middle classes. This can be 
read in the way that initial transition recession lead to a higher share of the poor than in 
the benchmark country Germany, but a higher share of the rich deciles as proportion of 
national income. This is supported by the picture to be discussed in the functional  
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Figure 2.1. Personal income distribution, The Czech Republic 1988, 1992 and 1996 
distribution, where the transition recession created went along with rising shares of 
profits and declining wages (see figure 2.2.). The third Lorenz curve of 1996 lies slightly 
below the benchmark indicating that the income distribution is a bit more unequal in the 
Czech Republic, but well in the range of its neighbouring country in the West. Also it is 
notable that there was no sharp change in equality, but a rather moderate and gradual 
development. 
With regards to theIn F figure 2.2. it should has to be noted, that there is a statistical 
break in reporting by the Czech Statistical office after 1991. “Business and others” is 
replaced by “operating surplus” and other categories were changed as well. (see below) 
due to the systemic break. Nevertheless it seems to be remarkable that the share of 
profits grew in the beginning of transition only to fall sharply in later the years. after. 
The dramatic rise of the profit share in the crisis year 1991 reflects the realisation of 
quasi-rents during initial transition. The coincidence between sharply rising profit shares 
and crisis in general income development is notable. The adjustment followed one year 
later, when profit shares fell as the consequence of falling investment in the previous 
year. Profit ratios (share of operating profits) increased slightly in 1993, but then 
remained stable until the 1997 crisis. The same observation holds for the wages ratios 
(labour compensation). Even property income shows moderate changes only. A careful 
interpretation could just state that aAn increased share of profits went along with 
positive growth rates from 1994 to 1996. The overall observation consists What is 
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apparent is  in the stability of the functional income distribution over the transformation 
period. 
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Figure 2.2. Functional income distribution and transfers, in per cent of national 
income, Czech Republic 1989-1998 
4.2.2 Hungary 
For Hungary LIS has only two datasets, but yet again the message is clear. In socialist 
times the degree of inequality was nearly identical with the benchmark country, though 
on a far lower level. Inequality increased from 1991 to 1994, mainly for the benefit of 
the upper middle classes, whereas the proportion of the lower deciles remained stable. 
Like in the Czech Republic this move followed a rather modest and gradual path rather 
than displaying a dramatic jump in inequality. 
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Figure 2.3. Personal income distribution, Hungary 1991 and 1994 
For Hungary the functional income distribution also shows a jump inof the profit share 
in the beginning of transformation aslike in the Czech Republic albeit one year later, in 
1992. An interesting detail is that property income doubled even one year before and 
decreased to its normal level near 5%five per cent the year after. It is surprising that this 
type of income was recorded in socialist times and we may suspect that property owners 
made a fortune in the initial year of transition. Social transfers plummeted after the end 
of communism, but the wage ratio rose increased up to above 60%sixty per cent in the 
years 1992-1994. The proportions between wages and profits change in 1995, the year 
of the austerity programme in Hungary. In that year the profit share grew to more than 
twenty per cent and remained on that level until today. Wages account for around 60 per 
cent. Social transfers were reduced as well and remained around ten per cent from 1996 
onwards. Across the board functional income distribution can be characterised as being 
stable. The comparison between personal income distribution and functional income 
distribution including transfers suggest, that the jump of profit quotas between 1991 and 
1994 affected only increased only the top decile; whereas the upper middle classes lost 
income shares as shown in the wider distance of the 1994 Lorenz curve to the 45-degree 
line (see also tables 1 and 2). 
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Figure 2.4. Functional income distribution and transfers, in per cent of national 
income, Hungary 1989-1998 
4.2.3 Poland 
A similar picture similar as into Hungary has been found for Poland. Here there is only a 
very marginal increase in inequality until 1992, but a considerable higher degree of 
inequality  
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Figure 2.5. Personal income distribution, Poland 1986, 1992 and 1995 
in 1996. It is notable that this increase developed for the benefit of the upper middle 
classes, whereas the top decile and the lower deciles remained relatively stable. The 
degree of inequality is slightly below the benchmark. The overall picture is well in line 
with the Czech Republic and Hungary representing a gradual move towards higher 
inequality, which is in the range of EU inequalities. 
For Poland at first glance the proportions of profits and wages seem to be unusual, but 
the size is influenced by the tax system and cross-country comparisons of the absolute 
size of quotas are not intended here. Focus of interest in this study is change rather than 
size. In 1989 and 1990 earnings were not divided into wages and surplus. The first 
observation is that social transfers decrease in the initial phase of transformation and 
remain slightly above ten per cent from 1993 onwards. One reason for this relative high 
level are the pension payments, which were kept at levels very close to previous 
earnings of the recipients. Apart from this aspect functional income distribution remains 
stable throughout transformation. The share of wages almost displays almost no change 
and profits sometimes increase slightly on the expense of property income and vice 
versa, but these minor movements are likely to be caused by interest rate variations. As 
interest payments are the major factor in property income an increase in the market rate 
of interest increases this component of functional income distribution. Again, we find a 
picture of stability in functional income distribution, if other sources do not grow 
correspondingly (ceteris paribus). Like in Hungary, the jump in profits from 1992 to 
1995 was for the benefited of the top decile only, but decreased the income shares of the 
upper middle classes as shown in the wideninged distance of the 1995 curve in 
particular for the deciles 5 to 9 (see also tables 1 and 2). 
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Figure 2.6. Functional income distribution and transfers, in per cent of national 
income, Poland 1991-1998 
4.2.4. Russia 
Russia is different thano the observations above. First of all eEven in communist times 
the level of inequality was higher than in other European socialist countries and it was 
also higher than in Germany. Secondly, there is a sharp increase in inequality from 
1991/1992 to 1995/19968 in the course of transition, which went along with declining 
GDP. Thirdly, the winners of the change in income inequality are clearly to be located 
withinthe people in the top decile. There is a shift from the deciles 1 – 7 up to the top 
decile creating the class of the so-called ‘super rich’. However the observation needs to 
be read more carefully against observations in the other countries under review in this 
study, as the development of personal income distribution has to be understood against 
the Russian background of declining real GDP. TheA  bottom decile received of 1.4 per 
cent% of income (see tables), which is only half of the value infor the other countries, 
including the benchmark., means that the in terms of income lowest ten per cent of the 
population gain 1.4 percent of national income only. This suggests more extensive that 
there has been created new poverpovertyty in the course of transition in Russia. Also the 
distance to the 45-degree line for the middle classes has widened indicating a further 
shift towards the ‘super rich’. These two aspects raise some methodological concern 
about measuring inequality with the Gini coefficient. If we have, like in Russia, a 
hollowing out of the middle classess and the creation of poverty and a new class of 
‘super rich’, than it does not seem very sensible to take the average income as 
denominator. Instead it would be more appropriate to define a poverty line in order to 
find the real dimension of the tragedy in income inequality in Russia. For the sake of 
coherence this exercise has not been pursued in this study. 
                                                 
8 Data for 1991 and 1996 are obtained from Sigmund 1998 and refer to earnings rather than to income. 
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Figure 2.7. Personal income distribution, Russia 1991, 1992, 1995 and 1996 
For Russia, property income is not reported. The figure below displays a falling share of 
profits, which is no surprise against the background of figure 1, where a falling GDP 
could be observed. The lack of investment leads to falling profit ratios, whereas wages 
remain more or less stable. It seems as if transfers have increased, but these figures are 
an approximation (against net taxes ceteris paribus) only and care should not be 
exercised in interpreting this data. come over-interpreted. With its continuously falling 
share of profits Russia stands out as a case of changing functional distribution of 
income. We may suspect that this development lead to declining investment and as a 
with the consequence of declining GDP. as shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 2.8. Functional income distribution and transfers, in per cent of national 
income, Russia 1992-1998 
4.3. Cross-country comparisons 
To summarise the observations above, it is clear that we have two different sets of 
experience in transition from socialism to capitalism as far as income development and 
income distribution is concerned. At first glance the European countries seem to follow 
a convergence path well in the range of EU income distribution, although slightly below 
the German benchmark Lorenz curve. All the three EU accession countries followed a 
gradual path of increasing inequality. In sharp contrast to the European transition 
experience Russia stands out as a case of dramatically rising inequality leading to 
polarisation between lower and top income classes and a hollowing out of the middle 
classes. 
This is confirmed by a closer look into the deciles themselves (see appendix, tables 1 
and 2). Here we see that the bottom decile in Russia is half of the size of Germany as 
benchmark country and the other European transition countries. The top ten percent of 
the population accumulate about one third of national income in Russia whereas this 
income class gains about one fifth to one forth in the other countries. The European 
household statistics display strong middle classes in the European countries, which 
remains stable throughout transition. The picture is confirmed by per capita observations 
(table 2). 
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A closer look at the relevant deciles does, however, reveal that significant changes there 
have taken place. some strong changes with in the societies. To In begin with Poland, as 
the fastest growing economy, the bottom decile receives of 2,7%  of national income.  
This per cent is well within the EU (German) range. But describing the situation in this 
way This statement bears the problem to overlooks the fact that bottom decile the lowest 
ten percent of the Polish population in terms ofnow incohas 25% less income me 
receive now more than one quarter less of income than before., which is a major change 
indeed. Also the top decile has gained most over the course of transition. This is also 
true e latter observation applies for all transition countries under review. The share of 
the top decile is also significantly higher than in Germany. 
There is also one further observation with regards to the Czech Republic9. Here we find 
rather low bottom deciles within the household statistics (table 1) during socialism in 
comparison with other transition countries, but very high values within the per capita 
statistics (table 2). Vecernic (2000) has interpreted this as a consequence of communist 
ideology, where family values were less import compared to equality per capita. This 
has changed sharply in the transition period, where we find a twenty per cent decline of 
the bottom decile per capita. This can be explained by the fact that many women left the 
workforce of the low paid sector, which also explains the slight increase of the bottom 
decile in the household statistics in the years 1988 and 1996. 
Returning to the initial question about the interrelationship between growth and income 
distribution the observations have to be interpreted more carefully. The major picture 
remains correct only in so far as again Russia stands out, because here rising inequality 
coincides with declining income and growth. The question above for Russia needs to be 
revised in the way that one is tempted to say that sharply rising inequality has hampered 
growth through destabilising the climate for private investment and decreasing the state 
of confidence in the period under observtion.  
The normal inverted U-shape of the Kuznets curve shows rising inequality in the initial 
phase of growth with decreasing slope and after a maximum of inequality growing 
income is supported by declining inequality. Obviously some modifications are required 
for Russia, as here increasing inequality goes along with decreasing GDP. In that case a 
Kuznets relationship could only be pictured through a southwest extension of the 
‘classical’ curve, without any guaranty whether or not the ‘classical’ path will ever be 
reached (see graph 1). This does of course raises the question of whether a Kuznets 
curve for Russia does makes any sense at all. 
If we assume Kuznets curves for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the next 
obstacle is that we do not find much growth in the Czech Republic either. Reasons for 
this phenomenon of moderately rising inequality and stagnation of income will be 
explored in the following section. At this stage it is already difficult to decide, where to 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately for this country no coherent data set was available yet. 
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locate the Czech Republic on the ‘classical’ Kuznets curve. For the sake of the curve 
one could assume that the Czech Republic finds itself on a part of the rising branch of 
the curve with a rather steep slope, where a moderate increase in inequality does not 
have a substantial effect on growth. Again the whole construction of the curve with an 
almost vertical part appears to be dubious. 
For Hungary and Poland the locus on the Kuznets curve would be close to its maximum. 
The increase in inequality has been growth promoting and these countries performances 
suggest that the relatively high level of equality maintained throughout transition has 
stabilised the catching up development moving toward a convergence path to EU levels.  
These economies are now growing more slowly and it may be speculated that the 
maximum of the curve is reached, where higher income equality would foster growth.. 
Graph 1: The Kuznets curve for transition countries 
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5. Country performances reconsidered 
One aspect of transition economics is that available data are in transition themselves10. 
Therefore it appears to be not only legitimate but also most appropriate to apply a 
hermeneutic method rather than thorough econometrics. In particular in the context of 
income and growth for the period under review it remains uncertain whether we are 
observing growth or a business cycle.  
 what effect has to be attributed to growth and to which extend it is a phenomenon of the 
business cycle. We have to operate with stylised facts. 
The intellectual challenge in the Czech case is that it contradicts conventional wisdom 
in two ways. Its growth performance does not fit into the picture of the J-curve and its 
development of income distribution does not follow a Kuznets curve. It is therefore 
misleading that income dynamics of transition in Europe can be graphed in such a way 
(see for example Aghion/Commander 1999) and only Russia and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) would follow a different path. The difference between the Czech Republic 
and (according to Keane/Prasad) Poland compared to Russia and FSU is however that 
we can not observe a steep rise in inequality settling at a high level, whereas the myth on 
East Europe is a Kuznets type of rising inequality decreasing after a period of growth. In 
the Czech case we have to explain the relative stability of income distribution going 
along with transformation recession, upswing, recession and finally stagnation of 
national income. 
One possibility is that data might not be reliable and inequality might be far higher, if 
the shadow economy could have been included into this study. Schneider/Enste (2000) 
present data that introduce the Czech Republic (differing according to estimation 
method) as the transition country with the lowest share of black economy. However, in 
the context of dynamics of the shadow economy we find the strongest increase of the 
share of the black economy in the initial transition period of 1989-90 to 1990-93 on 
average as percentage of GDP from 6.4 to 13.4 (according to the Johnson et al. method, 
see Schneider/Enste 2000, p. 101) in the Czech Republic.  If we assume that profits are 
not declared, then higher income categories have benefited most from moving into the 
black economy. Also the lowest category of income, which were characterised by a high 
number of children might be part of the shadow economy, as this group consists largely 
of Roma families, who in tendency have more children but are not officially registered. 
The degree of correction of the Czech stability picture must be uncertain by nature of the 
argument. 
                                                 
10 Some of the data presented in this study rely on the yearbooks of the national Statistical Offices, in 
particular those on functional income distribution. There the rRevised figures of previous years 
sometimes differ sometimes at aroundby almost 20% per cent. Another example is the paper by Keane 
and Prasad (2000), which rejects Milanovic's findings on empirical grounds for the case of Poland.  
These authors come to similar results for Poland as this paper does for the Czech Republic. 
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Finally there seems to be some evidence for turning round the point made by Dollar and 
Kraay (2000) stating “growth is good for the poor”, depending on the state of 
development in economies of transition. Taking Barro’s $ 2000 threshold not serious 
but as an illustration, it could be that inequality is too low to allow for the emergence of 
the Kuznets curve. Not even Barro would go so far to suggest income distribution policy 
in favour of the rich, but the infrastructure for the creation of profit expectations in the 
official private sector might demand for a potential of higher inequality in the Czech 
Republic (see Hölscher 2000). The stability of social transfers shown above does not 
work in that direction and a redirection into education could be carefully advised. The 
argument is reinforced by rising unemployment in the Czech Republic. But as stated 
earlier the case for the Kuznets curve for such a short period of time is problematic. 
Hungary and Poland are explained quickly, as here we find the situation, where a rather 
high level of equality assures the social acceptance of the reform process. We have 
located these two countries slightly before the maximum of the Kuznets curve. This 
implies that we have not yet reached the benchmark scenario of Germany, where it can 
be assumed the growth on the high level of income is supported by more equality within 
the society. Some more inequality for the benefit of the upper middle classes (deciles 6 
to 8) in Hungary and Poland would probably have a growth promoting effect though 
increased demand for household consumption. In principle we have a ‘well behaved’ 
Kuznets relationship between equality and growth in Hungary and Poland. 
The Russian case reconsidered raises the question of how this population managed to 
survive transformation without major civil wars or other forms of political unrest. What 
springs to mind in the first place is the huge non-market sector of subsistence, which 
keeps households alive though Dacha farming. Schneider/Enste estimate the size of the 
shadow economy in Russia at 20-27 percent in Russia (higher values are estimated for 
other former Soviet Union countries). Secondly the political system in Russia is 
apparently capable to pacify society although inequality is rising dramatically. Thirdly 
Russia has experienced a longer period of declining income, following the J-curve 
pattern, which certainly had a strong impact on the lower income classes and the 
increasing poverty. Gradstein/Milanovic (2002) suggest that democratic experience 
might play a crucial role for income inequality. Such a historical approach clearly points 
towards the difference between the Central European Countries and Russia. The 
conclusion for economic policy will have to take experiences from developing countries 
into account for the case of Russia. 
6. Convergence versus divergence 
The general insight won from tThis study shows one must be careful in arguing that 
there is that a causal relationship between general income creation, or even growth, and 
equality in terms of an interpretation of the direction has to be very careful. Income 
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distribution seems to be a social variable to be seen in its entire historical context11. 
Even if the Kuznets curve can be observed as an empirical regularity the explanation for 
this regularity remains dubious. 
Progress however has been made in measurement and data collection. This is not always 
true for transition economies, where assessments become outdated by a turn of facts 
sometimes very quickly. In this study demystification of the J-curve of transformation as 
well as a Kuznets curve of transition in Eastern Europe are considered to be the major 
contribution to progress in economic knowledge. 
This finally questions the role of the state with regards to income equality in the 
transition process. Political economy of transition has pointed at political constraints for 
a while (see for example Roland 2000 and 2002) and the convergence in income 
distribution to German (or EU) levels is well documented and mirrored in for example 
the creation of convergence to EU levels of law and property rights. The interesting 
findings of this study are that for other issues of EU accession the new members have 
been set clear criteria, be it the Maastricht Treaty, the acquis communitaire or ERM II, 
which in themselves might have set a convergence process towards EU standards into 
motion. Certainly incentives were created, which do not exist for Russia, which finds 
itself within an entirely different historical context including a very different set of 
institutions of society and governance. Democracy as such is not a sufficient 
explanation, as while Russia’s post-communist reforms were accompanied by huge 
increases in inequality, the reverse happened in Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Poland. To identify institutional factors in respect income distribution more precisely, a 
more advanced research design is required. This raises a new conceptual challenge of 
frameworks used to study growth and income distribution in the transition process. 
 
 
                                                 
11 For a wide-ranging institutional approach see Tomann (2000) or Hölscher (1996). 
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Table 1 Cumulated personal income distribution of selected countries and years and in comparison to Germany 1998 (per household), in per cent 
cumulated quintile shares 
 lowest fifth 2
nd
 fifth 3
rd
 fifth 4
th
 fifth 
 
Cumulated 
income 
Difference to 
Germany 1998 
Cumulated 
income 
Difference to 
Germany 1998 
Cumulated 
income 
Difference to 
Germany 1998 
Cumulated 
income 
Difference to 
Germany 1998 
Czech Republic: 1988 ** 6.6 -1.4 20.1 -1.7 40.1 0.4 65.3 2.3 
 1992 11.2 3.2 26.4 4.6 44.6 4.9 66.8 3.8 
 1996 ** 6.7 -1.3 19.0 -2.8 36.3 -3.4 59.9 -3.1 
Hungary: 1991 8.7 0.7 21.8 0.0 39.0 -0.7 61.5 -1.5 
 1994 8.1 0.1 20.7 -1.1 36.9 -2.8 58.4 -4.6 
Poland:  1986 8.7 0.7 22.1 0.3 40.1 0.4 63.7 0.7 
 1992 9.0 1.0 22.7 0.9 40.2 0.5 62.8 -0.2 
 1995 7.7 -0.3 20.9 -0.9 38.2 -1.5 60.6 -2.4 
Russia: 1991 * 7.7 -0.3 20.3 -1.5 37.2 -2.5 60.1 -2.9 
 1992 4.8 -3.2 13.7 -8.1 27.8 -11.9 49.1 -13.9 
 1995 4.5 -3.5 13.9 -7.9 27.8 -11.9 49.0 -14.0 
 1996 * 4.1 -3.9 13.1 -8.7 27.6 -12.1 46.0 -130 
Note: Data for differences to Germany 1998 are in percentage points with positive numbers indicating higher quintile shares as compared to Germany. The highest fifth equals 
100 per cent. 
Sources: LIS Database; * Sigmund (1998); ** Hölscher (2000); *** SOEP (DIW 2000). 
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Table 2 Changes of personal income distribution of selected countries between selected years (per household), in per cent change rates 
 lowest fifth 2
nd
 fifth 3
rd
 fifth 4
th
 fifth 
Czech Republic: 1992/1988 69.7 31.3 11.2 2.3 
 1996/1992 -40.2 -28.0 -18.6 -10.3 
Hungary: 1994/1991 -6.9 -5.0 -5.4 -5.0 
Poland:  1992/1986 3.4 2.7 0.2 -1.4 
 1995/1992 -14.4 -7.9 -5.0 -3.5 
Russia: 1992/1991 -37.7 -32.5 -25.3 -18.3 
 1995/1992 -6.3 1.5 0.0 -0.2 
 1996/1995 -8.9 -5.8 -0.7 2.0 
Sources: see table 1. 
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Table 3 Distribution of household income according to decile shares (per household), in per cent decile shares 
Decile 
Share 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Russia Germany 
1988** 1992 1996** 1991 1994 1986 1992 1995 1991* 1992 1995 1996* 1998*** 
1 2.5 4.9 2.8 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.7 3.1 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.8 
2 4.1 6.3 3.9 5.2 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.6 3.0 3.1 2.7 5.2 
3 5.9 7.2 5.6 6.1 5.9 6.1 6.4 6.1 5.8 3.9 4.2 3.9 6.4 
4 7.6 8.0 6.7 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.3 7.1 6.8 5.0 5.2 5.1 7.4 
5 9.3 8.7 7.9 8.0 7.6 8.4 8.2 8.1 7.9 6.3 6.3 6.5 8.4 
6 10.7 9.5 9.4 9.2 8.6 9.6 9.3 9.2 9.0 7.8 7.6 8.0 9.5 
7 12.0 10.5 10.9 10.4 10.0 11.0 10.5 10.4 10.5 9.5 9.3 9.9 10.8 
8 13.2 11.7 12.7 12.1 11.5 12.6 12.1 12.0 12.4 11.8 11.9 12.5 12.5 
9 15.1 13.4 15.4 14.4 15.0 14.9 14.6 14.4 15.3 15.4 16.7 16.9 15.1 
10 19.6 19.9 24.7 24.0 26.6 21.4 22.5 24.9 24.6 35.3 34.2 33.1 21.9 
1 - 10 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: see table 1. 
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